### 1

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend an expansion of the scope of the United States core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(<http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Should requires action

AHD 2k

(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### ‘Its’ means United States Antitrust Laws.

US District Court 7 (United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, “AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin,” *2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808*, Lexis)

The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Violation: The aff violates the above words requirements of government action

#### Prefer our interpretation-

#### 1---Fairness---debate is a competitive game with a winner and a loser---keeping the game equitable is essential to all of its benefits---allowing untopical advocacies causes the aff to win disproportionally---the ballot can’t resolve their offense but it can remedy a fairness violation

#### 2---Clash---The only intrinsic benefit from debate comes from clash over particular issues---a limited point of predictable stasis for that discussion improves the quality of that clash and allows the negative to more rigorously test whatever the affirmative proposes. The impact is methodological humility. Clash breaks down dogma both by exposing the flaws in one’s argument and by incentivizing teams to think about how their opponents might respond to their arguments to gain a better understanding of their own position’s weakness.

#### Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

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IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

### Case

#### 1---presumption. Challenging capital at the “level of subjectivity” is not resistance.

Reed 16, PhD, Professor of Political Science @ Penn (Adolph, “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist “Left”,” <http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2>)

More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of pre-political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations, which was then all the rage in cultural studies programs. Proponents of the political importance of this domain insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian resistance, a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves. Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political economy of academic life, including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’ academic capital.8 I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following: At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they presume that those conditions necessarily, or even typically, lead to political action. They don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare.9 I assume that Trotskyists of their stripe still call themselves Marxists; if so, theirs is a Marxism that has more in common with geometry texts and the Baltimore Catechism than with open-ended historical materialist analysis. Indeed, the catechistic disposition is the spirit animating their snarky observation that it is “telling” – though they never indicate what it would tell if the charge were correct — that I supposedly “never engage” with any of the “massive” evidence that racial discrimination persists against black Americans. I have never denied the persistence of racial discrimination and therefore have no idea what they mean by “engage with.” I assume that what they want is for me to recite a litany of abuses or violations, doing the Confiteor at the same time, whether or not doing so would contribute to understanding or rectifying anything. I don’t have to testify to my knowledge of the existence of racial discrimination. I’ve dealt with being on the receiving end of it all my life.10 Moreover, racial discrimination and racial disparity are not the same thing. The latter does not automatically result from the former. And discrimination is often not necessary for, or even implicated in, reproduction of disparities. This is a key argument that Merlin Chowkanyun and I develop in our critique of the discourse of racial disparity.11 We do not deny the existence of racial disparities. We do argue that “racism,” accompanied by whatever adjectives – institutional, structural, postracial, etc.12 — is often not helpful for understanding the genesis of those disparities, how they are reproduced, or how to address them in policy interventions. Instead of engaging with that argument Birch and Heideman resort to baseless observations such as their claim that I have “always prided [myself] on being ahead of the curve.” This personal characterization is a bizarre alternative to critical argument about what I actually contend. And, of course, this is yet another area in which Birch and Heideman have no idea what they’re talking about. They don’t know me or for that matter anything about me that’s not a matter of public record, in what I’ve written for public consumption. Like much in their essay, this is an instance of uninformed proclamation of what they would like to be true to fit the a priori commitments of their dogma, which, by the way, is rather surprisingly like liberal individualism in the extent to which it hinges on speculation regarding individuals’ motives rather than examination of patterned social relations and processes. Haste to proclaim the magical ship’s pending arrival on the coastline is more an effusion of True Belief – and that’s the generous characterization — than sober analysis. And the magical predictions don’t require evidence of oppositional agency of any sort. Many in the Jacobin audience may be too young to recall how ventriloquy of the kind that Birch and Heideman and others now project onto BLM demonstrations supported proclamations of grand, transformative potential that some ersatz leftists assigned to the 1995 Million Man March and then to the 1999 Seattle anti-WTO demonstrations. More, however, should be able to remember the tsunami of almost clinically naïve pronouncements in 2008 and 2009 that the financial crash had either put neoliberalism on its deathbed or perhaps already killed it. For those who don’t recall that moment, Merlin Chowkwanyun’s fine critical assessment should be a bracing corrective.13 The authors also construct straw men and blatantly misrepresent arguments to provide themselves with easy targets. They adduce the fact that BLM has generated a program as a counter to my contention that that fact is not especially meaningful. They do so, of course, without fully addressing my actual argument: Some, perhaps many, of the items propounded in the initial 10 Point Plan are fine as a statement of reforms that could make things better in the area of criminal justice policy and practice. Many, if not most, of those assembled under the rubric ‘Vision for Black Lives’ are empty sloganeering and politically wrongheaded and/or unattainable and counterproductive. However, the problem is not a shortage of potentially effective reforms that could be implemented. The problem is much more a political and strategic one. And the focus on racial disparity both obscures the nature and extent of the strategic challenges we face and…undercuts our ability to mount a potentially effective challenge (italics added).14 I noted as well that, reminiscent of the trajectory of Black Power, a similar moment of affectively evocative political expression, the programs articulated in the name of BLM came primarily as responses to criticisms that it lacked a program. Their relation to the actual political practice of those who purport to represent the brand – and how else are we to understand the reality beneath the fatuous justifications offered by Garza and others as to why it’s important to honor the hashtag and its originators? — is not at all clear. The notion that having a program is eo ipso an indication of being “part of a broader radicalization around issue [sic] of class and inequality” is reasonable only within the sectarian universe of resolutionary socialists15 who measure one another’s significance by whether or not they publish newspapers or have good websites. Birch and Heideman and I apparently talk past each other regarding whether BLM should be seen as a serious political movement. Where one comes down on that question depends on how one understands what counts as a movement. I have no idea what their criteria are; I do know that, as public relations engineering has become increasingly prominent as an alternative to slow, careful organizing and constituency building, the label has been thrown around ever more promiscuously. When I refer to a political movement, as I’ve stressed for many years,16 I mean a relatively durable social and political force with a demonstrated capacity to mobilize resources and clearly defined constituencies – including actual people who have names and addresses – to advance programs and agendas with the goal of altering public policy and/or power relations. I don’t see how BLM qualifies by that standard. Activism undertaken under that name has contributed significantly to focusing public attention on patterns of police abuse and broader miscarriages of justice in the criminal justice system. However, from the perspective I indicate, extrapolations from that fact to broader claims that BLM is a substantial political movement are hyperbolic or aspirational. Birch and Heideman may operate with a different understanding of what constitutes a political movement. I assume they do because of their insistence that BLM is one, but they don’t address that question. They seem to accept proclamation by the self-appointed spokespersons – including those who claim not to be spokespersons while obviously adopting that role – press releases, demonstrations and other staged events in the mass-mediated (including social media) pageantry of protest as adequate evidence. In any event, I thought I had also made clear that the principal reason I, in their view, “refuse to engage even with the aspects” of the BLM current that the authors presume to be “in sync with” my politics and am not interested in helping to “advance a class perspective within the movement” is that my judgment is that what passes under the rubric BLM is primarily a mélange of episodic actions and performances and is not a coherent political movement. I know the response to that skepticism is assertion of BLM’s inner potentiality, which supporters contend is visible through a combination of esoteric interpretation and Faith and which skeptics are too jaundiced or biased to see – i.e., the cargo-cult pathology. Birch and Heideman say as much themselves: It is of course true that “Black Lives Matter” is shorthand for a variety of organizing efforts, whose goals can sometimes be opaque. The protests of the past two years are hardly the first to focus on questions of police violence or racism. And like many movements today, Black Lives Matter suffers from chronic volatility and organizational weakness.17 Thus even they acknowledge that, as Cedric Johnson indicates in a forthcoming article, who and what BLM is are in no way clear. The contemporary “movement for black lives” is a diverse phenomenon – horizontal, decentralized, and driven by organizations like #BlackLivesMatter, the Dream Defenders, the Black Youth Project 100, Assata’s Daughters, Freedom, Inc., Southerners on New Ground, Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle, as well as dozens of other youth groups, black student unions and community-based organizations. Contemporary protests have found broad support among liberals, black nationalists, socialists, clergy, politicians, civil liberties advocates, and urbanites…Of course, there are different ideological tendencies operating within the movement for black lives. Broad acceptance of black ethnic politics, however, facilitates the very brokerage politics that many activists dislike about older black civil rights organizations. The spats between black lives matter’s founders and those who sought to use the hashtag without their permission reflected a proprietary sensibility, more suited to product branding and entrepreneurship than popular social struggle. Despite the various allusions to class and insistence by some supporters that there is a class-politics at the heart of black lives matter activism, the rapture of “unapologetic blackness” and the ethnic politics that expression implies will continue to lead away from the kind of political work that is needed to end the policing crisis.18 Comparing BLM’s commitment to the romantic racialism of the National Black Convention movement and following its trajectory through the 1972 Gary Convention, which rested on a similar commitment to a romantic racialism, Johnson contends: If the Gary Convention is the model here, then what we might expect is the fracturing of the movement into different brokerage camps, each claiming to represent the “black community” more effectively than the other, and more capable of amassing the necessary counterpower that might be politically impactful. One signpost of this possible outcome is the growing fissure among activists over school privatization and futile attempts to reconcile those differences with romantic calls to black unity…Black Lives Matter co-founder Patrice Cullors gives a sense of this problem, when she says that she will continue to work with black neoliberals because of their common bond as blacks. “That I don’t agree with neoliberalism doesn’t encourage me to launch an online assault against those who do. We can, in fact, agree to disagree. We can have healthy debate. We can show up for one another as Black folks inside of this movement in ways that don’t isolate, terrorize, and shame people – something I’ve experienced first hand.” She mistakes the core basis of political life, however. Sustained political work is held together by shared historical interests, especially those that connect to our daily lives and felt needs, not sentimental “ties of blood.”19 To what, then, are Birch and Heideman referring when they declare BLM’s potential? Which strains are the real or even the really real expressions of the tendency’s radical anti-capitalist telos? The answer, steeped in circular reasoning, is the ones that Birch and Heideman want to believe are consistent with their transhistorical, preformationist notions of how movements grow. This is not simply a matter of stipulating different criteria for assigning the label “political movement.” BLM’s amorphousness reflects and enables another tiresome political pathology that has become increasingly common in an era when an actually insurgent left is so remote from living memory and cargo-cult politics is so prominent. Activists, typically without visible institutional connections, stage more or less flamboyant events that often evoke nostalgic associations with earlier insurgencies – civil rights/Black Power demonstrations, sit-ins, militant “street action,” even purely rhetorical appropriation of the phrase “general strike” as a reference that sounds appealingly militant, totally disconnected from any concrete practice. Prior to BLM, Occupy and, more cynically, the Tea Party were the most highly publicized illustrations of this phenomenon, which is similar to an ad agency approach to movement-building. The point of these performances is to project simulacra of popular insurgency, which then become justification for issuing press statements and manifestos and, depending on the mood of the moment and skills of the operators, being recognized as spokespersons for the fictive movement. In the public interest world such groups are described as “astro-turf,” as contrasted to grassroots. Proliferation of this Kabuki theater politics among leftists stems in part from the dialectic of desperation and wishful thinking that underlies the cargo-cult tendency; it is commonly driven by an understandable sense of urgency that the dangers facing us are so grave as to require some immediate action in response. That dialectic encourages immediatist fantasies as well as tendencies to define the direct goal of political action as exposing, or bearing witness against, injustice. Occupy, for instance, proceeded from premises at least overlapping a tendency I have described as the Myth of the Spark,20 the notion that single events or dramatic acts can in themselves galvanize mass mobilization. That was also the dream that too many enthusiasts crafted for themselves about the Sanders campaign. Fetishization of the power of social media feeds the fantasy that movement-building can be automatic and instantaneous. That disposition is exacerbated in a context in which organizing as a project of deepening and broadening an actual base through building solidaristic relationships around shared interests is not part of an activistist culture in which radicalism is more posture and performance than strategic pursuit of a program.21 The strains of Trotskyism and anarchism popular in some activist quarters are drawn to spontaneist and voluntarist approaches to politics, which fit comfortably as well with the logic of insta-celebrity generated through Potemkin internet and social media campaigns. From that perspective, one of the most revealing and chilling features of the BLM phenomenon has been the unself-conscious clarity with which Alicia Garza and other of its prominent personalities represent, and no doubt genuinely understand, crafting and projecting their individual personae as identical with advancing political objectives.22 The potential for opportunism is great because the inertial material imperatives impel in that direction and unrestrained because the “movement” has no concrete constituency to which its spokespeople are accountable. What we get instead are shopworn calls to distinguish the really authentic BLM voices – i.e., what DeRay McKesson was until he wasn’t – from the fakers and hustlers and those who are genuinely grassroots from those who aren’t. So Birch and Heideman finger McKesson as epitomizing a “black professional class selling a desiccated form of opposition to racism as radical politics.” What distinguishes this “desiccated form of opposition to racism” from the good, radical anti-racism they insist is out there? The only clue we have is that McKesson embodies the former. Yet a year ago he embodied the latter! This kind of political differentiation grounded on claims to racial authenticity rehearses the product cycle in the hip-hop industry in the 1990s, in which an act started out packaged as authentic or hardcore, attained success and became crossover and thence became a target against which those that follow proclaim their own real authenticity. This sort of politics is also, as we’ve seen at least since Black Power, a hustler’s paradise. And all the millennial versions of New Age-y bullshit about leaderlessness and structurelessness obscure the fact that absence of organizational mechanisms of accountability enable anyone to say anything, or deny anything said, in the name of the “movement.” Overestimation of the political significance of protest and a related, all too familiar problem of confusing militancy and radicalism contribute to exaggerating the significance of eruptions like those associated with BLM. Militancy is a posture; radicalism is linked to program for social transformation, and protests do not necessarily challenge power relations at all. In some ways, as political scientists have pointed out for generations, they can validate existing power relations insofar as they appeal to established authority to accommodate their demands and pursue more effective incorporation into extant governing coalitions.23 Although they are so commonplace now that most people no doubt rehearse them unreflectively, presumptions that protest actions and militant postures are intrinsically radical or follow a natural trajectory leading them toward radicalism depend on the nostalgic wishful thinking and forms of fallacious reasoning I’ve already discussed.

#### 2---double-bind. Either:

#### a---the aff functionally fiats a nationwide revolution against debt--- the former is a voting issue because it enables them to weigh hundreds of millions of individuals changing their minds; the latter is insolvent because single people can’t effectively refuse debt.

#### b---it advocates individual debt refusal that doesn’t need to be accompanied by broader change---that fails because individuals can’t effectively refuse debt

#### 3---refusing debt leads to elite backlash and repression.

Wright 17, \*Erik Olin Wright, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. Director of A. E. Havens Center for Social Justice, University of Wisconsin-Madison, (2017, “How to be an Anti-capitalist for the 21st Century”, https://www.redalyc.org/journal/124/12452111002/html/)

Smashing

This is the classic strategic logic of revolutionaries. The rationale goes something like this:

The system is rotten. All efforts to make life tolerable within capitalism will eventually fail. From time to time small reforms that improve the lives of people may be possible when popular forces are strong, but such improvements will always be fragile, vulnerable to attack and reversible. Ultimately it is an illusion that capitalism can be rendered a benign social order in which ordinary people can live flourishing, meaningful lives. At its core, capitalism is unreformable. The only hope is to destroy it, sweep away the rubble and then build an alternative. As the closing words of the early twentieth century song Solidarity Forever proclaim, “We can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old.” The full realization of the emancipatory alternative may be gradual, but the necessary condition for such a gradual transition is a ruptural break in the existing system of power.

But how to do this? How is it possible for anti-capitalist forces to amass sufficient power to destroy capitalism and replace it with a better alternative? This is indeed a daunting task, for the power of dominant classes that makes reform an illusion also blocks the revolutionary goal of a rupture in the system. Anti-capitalist revolutionary theory, informed by the writings of Marx and extended by Lenin, Gramsci and others, offered an attractive argument about how this could take place:

While it is true that much of the time capitalism seems unassailable, it is also a deeply contradictory system, prone to disruptions and crises. Sometimes those crises reach an intensity which makes the system as a whole fragile, vulnerable to challenge. In the strongest versions of the theory, there are even underlying tendencies in the “laws of motion” of capitalism for the intensity of such system-weakening crises to increase over time, so that in the long-term capitalism becomes unsustainable; it destroys its own conditions of existence. But even if there is no systematic tendency for crises to become ever-worse, what can be predicted is that periodically there will be intense capitalist economic crises in which the system becomes vulnerable and ruptures become possible. The problem for a revolutionary party, therefore, is to be in a position to take advantage of the opportunity created by such system-level crises to lead a mass mobilization to seize state power, either through elections or through an insurrectionary overthrow of the existing regime. Once in control of the state, the first task is to rapidly refashion the state itself to make it a suitable weapon of ruptural transformation, and then use that power to repress the opposition of the dominant classes and their allies, dismantle the pivotal power structures of capitalism, and build the necessary institutions for the long-term development of an alternative economic system.

In the 20th century, various versions of this general line of reasoning animated the imagination of revolutionaries around the world. Revolutionary Marxism infused struggles with hope and optimism, for it not only provided a potent indictment of the world as it existed, but also provided a plausible scenario for how an emancipatory alternative could be realized. This gave people courage, sustaining the belief that they were on the side of history and that the enormous commitment and sacrifices they were called on to make in their struggles against capitalism had real prospects of eventually succeeding. And sometimes, if rarely, such struggles did culminate in the revolutionary seizure of state power.

The results of such revolutionary seizures of power, however, were never the creation of a democratic, egalitarian, emancipatory alternative to capitalism. While revolutions in the name of socialism and communism did demonstrate that it was possible “to build a new world from the ashes of the old,” and in certain specific ways they may have improved the material conditions of life of most people for a period of time, the evidence of the heroic attempts at rupture in the 20th century is that they do not produce the kind of new world envisioned in revolutionary ideology. It is one thing to burn down old institutions and social structures; it is quite another to build emancipatory new institutions from the ashes.

Why the revolutions of the 20th century never resulted in robust, sustainable human emancipation is, of course, a hotly debated matter. Some people argue that this was just because of the historically specific, unfavorable circumstances of the attempts at system-wide ruptures. Revolutions occurred in economically backward societies, surrounded by powerful enemies. Some argue it was because of strategic errors of the leadership of those revolutions. Others indict the motives of leadership: the leaders that triumphed in the course of these revolutions were motivated by desires for status and power rather than the empowerment and wellbeing of the masses. And still others argue that failure is intrinsic to any attempt at radical rupture in a social system. There are too many moving parts, too much complexity and too many unintended consequences. As a result, attempts at system-rupture will inevitably tend to unravel into such chaos that revolutionary elites, regardless of their motives, will be compelled to resort to pervasive violence and repression to sustain social order. Such violence, in turn, destroys the possibility for a genuinely democratic, participatory process of building a new society.

#### 4---Ontological Debt Turn---The aff is premised on a logic that debt is something that should be feared and can be escaped—the better alternative is to embrace the universality of debt redefined as intersubjective relationality that can never be repaid.

Featherstone 17, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University. (Mark, Planet Utopia: Utopia, Dystopia, and Globalisation, <https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/9560/1/M%20Featherstone%20-%20Planet%20Utopia.pdf>

When we gaze into the screen—and this is particularly the case with the abyssal surface of the iPhone or iPad—we confirm our own identity in our reflection. We can simulate social connection through Facebook, Twitter, and various other social media platforms, but there is no other in virtual space, because the other is defined by a phenomenological thickness that makes demands upon me. This is exactly what Levinas (1999) understood through his theory of the ethics of faciality—when I look into the face of the other I become responsible and I feel compelled to respond. In the case of social media where friends proliferate it is easy to ignore people or, in the case of FaceTime, simply refuse the connection in the name of the kind of defensive individualism Bruno Bettelheim (1972) understood through the concept of autism. The contemporary social media self is, therefore, the ideal neoliberal individual, who refuses relation to the other because of the potential threat the other poses and prefers instead the isolation of what Bettelheim calls the empty fortress—that is, the militarised self. Moreover, this situation is not simply a cultural phenomenon concerned with social, or mobile, media technology, because I think that it is possible to identify a similar phobia of the irreducibility of social relations in the contemporary Eurozone crisis. While we certainly find a fear of debt in liberal thinkers, such as Locke and Hume, who thought that the state was a potential money pit, I would suggest that it is possible to identify a deeper ideological fear of indebtedness in the crisis that revolves around the refusal to accept that debt is part of the human condition itself. In Bataille’s (1991) vision of general economics, which refers to economics understood outside of the narrow confines of the discipline, it is impossible to repay our debts to others and world that sustain our existence. That is to say that the phenomenological relation is absolute. However, what we see in the contemporary euro crisis represents the height of hubris—the neoliberal economic idea that it is possible to repay debts is evidence of the fantastical belief in the existential isolation of the individual who needs nobody and rejects even the basic reliance on the biosphere itself, which becomes the ultimate commodity, even though it is absolutely beyond exchange. The Greek has, of course, become the scapegoat for the defence of this vision of restricted economics, where every debt is repayable and it is possible to balance the books, and miserly refusal of the truth of general economics which asserts the ecological connection between self, other, world, and earth. The Greek is thus the sacrificial lamb of neoliberal economics set on the refusal of the irreducibility of social relations, and this is why the sociologist must really oppose austerity in the name of an ethics of generosity, gifting, and the necessity of universal indebtedness. The problem of neoliberal debt is therefore less that we are always in debt, because existence is debt, but rather the fantastical belief that it is somehow possible to repay our debts and live in the black. The problem with this view is that it defends restricted economy from the truth of general economics by insisting that we repay what we owe to others with the result that, as Maurizio Lazzarato (2012) has shown, we effectively cancel our futures in subordination to our creditors. In this respect neoliberal capitalism abolishes the possibility of a future worthy of the name, because all the debtor can look forward to is an endless present of repayment. Under these conditions the lonely debtor is subject to the horror of dehumanisation—he cannot change his situation, or live into the future, because his existence is determined by the endless reproduction of his present indebtedness. This programmatic condition confirms the debtor’s systematic stupidity in the godless machine of late capitalism, and it is precisely this situation that conjures the spectres of sociology, the spectres of the social relation, that insist upon the truth of general economics where we cannot escape our reliance on each other or our world—the humanised biosphere.

#### Refusal of debt is a failed strategy – only embracing universal ontological indebtedness can effectively challenge capitalism

Featherstone 17, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University. (Mark, Planet Utopia: Utopia, Dystopia, and Globalisation, <https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/9560/1/M%20Featherstone%20-%20Planet%20Utopia.pdf>

While the refusal of the other is locked into liberal/neoliberal history, I believe that this vision of asociality is entirely unsustainable and that the phobic reaction to and rejection of the basic sociological truth that we find in the work of, for example, Gilbert Simondon, who wrote about trans-individualism, is what produces the procession of spectres that haunt contemporary capitalism with their complaints about injustice, misery, and injury (Combes, 2012). From the neoliberal perspective, there is no social relation, but only economic exchange that limits responsibility to contractual obligation, but the sociological truth the spectres reveal is that the human condition is to be responsible because the individual is founded on otherness in the present, born in the world made by the others of the past, and can only make a future on the basis of cooperation with other people who share the same vision of how the world might change. In this way, debt is irreducible, and this is essentially what Derrida (1994) explains in his Spectres of Marx—the spectre demands responsibility, and a recognition of indebtedness, that is horrific from the point of view of the neoliberal subject who learns that debt is somehow evil, but is in truth representative of the possibility of a space of freedom beyond the capitalist injunction to live out a lonely life in suffocating proximity to others who are similarly phobic about interdependence. Against Nietzsche’s theory of debt, which he sets out in his On the Genealogy of Morals (2008), explaining that essential indebtedness is the philosophy of the weak, the sociological vision of debt that the spectre communicates carries a message concerned with the necessity of humility born in the very real limitation of the self-identical individual in those others who sustain its existence. It is, of course, precisely this humility which is lost in contemporary global capitalism that individualises everybody, with the effect that it is possible to fortify Europe in the face of migrants on the run from destroyed lands and defend the necessity of severe austerity in the context of an economic system that supports exorbitant luxury. When neoliberal ideology rejects the connection, or responsibility, between self and other, the spectre returns in order to insist upon the irreducibility of the social relation. This is why the spectre is perhaps the key figure of early 21st-century sociology. In the wake of the end of history, and the globalisation of capitalism, the other is nowhere. In this situation there is no hope for self or other because there is no social situation open to change. As Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) note in their theory of ghosts, it is in these hopeless times when ghosts appear. In their view the spectre represents destroyed hope and in this respect keeps possibility alive post-mortem. According to Freud (2003c), the fear of ghosts, the fear of the dead who have not been able to pass over but remain in our world, is symbolic of the inability to internalise trauma. He thought that ghosts will continue to haunt the living until psychoanalysis works through the hard core of trauma which would allow the spectre to pass over to the other side. While we can read this therapeutic vision conservatively, so that spectres pass over and very little changes, it is also possible to take a more radical interpretation of what Laurence Rickels (2011) calls unmourning, or the inability to enable the ghost to leave the world of the living, and suggest that the spectral symbol of the need to address injustice, misery, and despair will only leave the scene when its conditions have been met. From this point of view, the spectre becomes a figure of utopian possibility and potential transformation, which is exactly what the sociologist of haunting Avery Gordon (2008) explains in her Ghostly Matters. For Gordon the spectre represents the possibility of enchantment, the possibility of hope, in a godless, disenchanted world where hopelessness has become the norm. In his Specters of Marx (1994), Derrida argues that the spectre represents a new atheological theology and that spiritless capitalism is fated to produce ghosts by virtue of the phantom objectivity of the commodity that fascinates the consumer. In this way Derrida shows how the pinnacle of late capitalist estrangement is characterised by the reflexive production of spectres. Against this neo-Gothic thesis one might claim that the hyper-visibility of our mediated world screens out the possibility of haunting, but what the works of Jeffrey Sconce (2000), Laurence Rickels (2011), and Stefan Andriopoulos (2013) show is that media is, and has always been, the space of modern and postmodern haunting. While there is a sense in which the postmodern theory of the ghostly concerns the production of a phantasmatic world where reality itself breaks down before universal simulation where ethics no longer make sense, my view is that the spectre of sociology has a very clear ethical, political function concerned with giving voice to the other who came before, must live in misery today, survive the catastrophe of the cancelled future, and centrally demand that the neoliberal individual recognises his claims on the basis of a social relation which is absolutely irreducible. In this respect it may be possible to supplement Derrida’s (1994) reference to Hamlet’s spectre with the case of Dickens’ (2003) Jacob Marley and the ghosts of Christmas past, present, and future, who show the story’s famous capitalist miser, Ebenezer Scrooge, the horror of the destroyed lives of Bob Cratchit and Tiny Tim and force him to face up to his responsibility for their situation. While Scrooge rejects Christmas in the name of the love of money, Marley’s ghost confronts him with his own traumatic past and shows him his own miserable end in order to show him that the social relation is irreducible and that generosity and indebtedness are essential human attributes necessary for survival. Thus Marley shows Scrooge what happens when we lose these human qualities and abandon each other for money—we live and die in misery. In much the same way that Dickens wrote about the failure of the spirit of generosity in his A Christmas Carol in 1843, which was coincidentally the same decade in which Marx and Engels published The Communist Manifesto, Derrida’s student and collaborator, Bernard Stiegler (2011, 2012, 2014) explores the failure of belief and spirit in contemporary capitalism and suggests that the postmodern, neoliberal, global economy has similarly transformed into a kind of hopeless, nihilistic machine for the production of profit. That is to say that while Dickens’ ghost emerges to critique Scrooge’s cruel and desperate vision of Victorian capitalism, Stiegler suggests that a similar spectralisation is necessary today in order to save postmodern society from economic destruction. Against Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2007), who suggested that the 1960s led to the emergence of a new individualistic spirit of capitalism which could provide people with hope in personal freedom and self-realisation, Stiegler suggests that this turn to what we might call hyper-individualism has led to the creation of the kind of miserable society Dickens imagines and Scrooge, Bob Cratchit, and Tiny Tim endure—the individual is everything and there is no room for generosity or a recognition of the sociality that makes people human. Indeed, there is no social space beyond the space of the miserable economic transaction. As a result, compassion is impossible, which Scrooge explains in his famous refusal of sympathy—‘Are there no prisons? Are there no workhouses?’—and the other is simply left to perish. This is the misery of capitalism, which Dickens painted in the 1840s, Marx and Engels imagined in the same period, and Bernard Stiegler explains in his works on contemporary disbelief and discredit. After the period of Keynesian state management between the horrors of Victorian laissez-faire and its rebirth in the form of neoliberal economic governmentality, Stiegler (2012) shows how the horror remains the same and that we must return to the question of fundamental human value once more. In this respect the message of the spectre of sociology, which reminds the individual of his irreducible responsibility for the other who must live and die in misery, is very similar to the message Marley’s ghost brought to Scrooge, who was confronted with destroyed lives and compelled to change his ways in order to produce a better world where responsibility, compassion, and sympathy form the basis of a sociological ethic of care. As a result it is possible to see that the utopianism of the spectre of sociology revolves around a rejection of the restricted economics of neoliberal individualism in the name of a vision of social relations where human value trumps the right to private property. Given this vision, the future the spectre conjures contains the possibility of a form of globalisation for itself, rather than in itself, where an integrated, sociological world organised around human value, rationality, and a recognition of a communistic ethic where I am necessarily bound to the other supersedes the systemic stupidity of the godless theodicy of neoliberal capitalism. However, the life of the red-green utopian fantasy of the spectre, where there is a recognition of the irreducible interdependence of self, other, world, and earth, is absolutely reliant on sociology and its idea of the social relation that remains beyond the pale in neoliberal society where the individual is the primary unit and his interactions with others are reducible to base, instrumental, economic transactions. Thus the radical nature of sociology resides in its necessary resistance to this weak vision of the social, and its critical, utopian potential is founded upon its core claim that ensures its marginality in the neoliberal universe that cannot recognise social interaction beyond economics. As a result sociology becomes a spectral form of knowledge concerned with the spectre of the social relation screened out by the hyper-rationality of neoliberal capitalism, where the individual is everything. While neoliberal ideology must oppose sociological truth because the ideas of irreducible relationality, trans-individualism, and absolute responsibility for others destroy the fantasy of the self-reliant, rugged individual and conjure the horror story of totalitarianism in its opposition to the unplanned society, from the sociological point of view, the militarised individualism of late capitalism suggests dystopia and catastrophe because there is no human future under conditions of systemic stupidity. These are the coordinates of the political struggle of the spectre of sociology, and the dystopian fantasy of the catastrophic future should not be dismissed in the name of realism, because the assumption of the worst opens up a space of utopian possibility simply because it becomes necessary to imagine change (Dupuy, 2014). Of course, neoliberal capitalism is complicit in the production of the vision of the late capitalist dystopia and the spectres that speak about the need for some other way, because its rejection of social responsibility condemns ever more people to live in poverty, misery, and despair.

#### 5---Debt Turn---A strategy of debt refusal that refuses to engage the state is just a strategy to get people killed and imprisoned.

#### The contempt loophole has fueled debt criminalization at the federal level and throughout the country

Pallardy 18 Carrie Pallardy journalist reporting for Saving for College, December 31, 2018 Can You Be Arrested for Not Repaying Your Student Loans? https://www.savingforcollege.com/article/can-you-be-arrested-for-not-repaying-your-student-loans

The potential consequences of unpaid student loans can be serious, ranging from damaged credit and lawsuits to even arrest. Even though the United States no longer has debtors’ prisons, it is still possible today to be arrested for unpaid debt, including unpaid student loan debt, if you fail to appear in court. A brief history of debtors’ prisons The term “debtors’ prisons” refers to a jail or prison specifically operated to hold people who are arrested for failing to pay back debts. The term “peonage” refers to compelling a borrower to work off a debt. Debtors’ prisons became illegal in the United States in 1833 and peonage was abolished by the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Bearden v. Georgia in 1983 that jailing people who cannot repay their debts is unconstitutional, according to The Marshall Project. Why do arrests for unpaid debt still happen? If debtors’ prisons are illegal, how can people still be arrested for not repaying debts like student loans? These types of arrests occur because of more than just unpaid debt. When someone defaults on their student loan, the lender will often turn to debt collectors. Filing a lawsuit against the borrower is one tactic collection agencies use to recoup the debt, according to an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report on the criminalization of private debt. Both private student loan lenders and the federal government can sue for failure to pay student loan debt. If the borrower is sued and fails to appear in court, the debt collection agency can ask the judge to issue an arrest warrant. The ACLU notes a number of reasons borrowers do not make their court appearances, including lack of notification and health issues. In some cases, notice was served at an incorrect or old address. Arrests made for unpaid student loan debt A total of 44 states allow the arrest of debtors for contempt of court, according to the ACLU report. Failing to appear in court after a court summons can result in a warrant and arrest. The warrant and arrest are for a failure to appear in court, not for a failure to repay student loan debt.

#### The federal govt is arresting people for student loan debts

Luperon 16 ALBERTO LUPERON is a reporter for Law & Crime , US Marshals Are Rounding Up People With Late Student Loan Debt Feb 16th, 2016, https://lawandcrime.com/crazy/us-marshals-are-rounding-up-people-with-late-student-loan-debt/

Are you behind on your student loans? Do you live in Houston, Texas? Then hold my hand because I have bad news. U.S. Marshals there are arresting people who are late on their federal college debt. Fox 26 reported an anonymous U.S. Marshal source who said they’re going to serve 1200 to 1500 warrants to people who are behind their federal student loans.

#### 6---Nation-state inevitable and resilient – economic and national identity data both prove.

Rodrik, Prof. of Economics, 12

(Dani Rodrik, Prof. in Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard, “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography— Who Needs the Nation-State?” *Economic Geography*, 89(1): 1-19)

Yet the nation-state refuses to wither away. It has proved remarkably resilient and remains the main determinant of the global distribution of income, the primary locus of market-supporting institutions, and the chief repository of personal attachments and affiliations. Consider a few facts. To test my students’ intuition about the determinants of global inequality, I ask them on the first day of class whether they would rather be rich in a poor country or poor in a rich country. I tell them to consider only their own consumption level and to think of rich and poor as referring to the top and bottom 10 percent of a country’s income distribution. A rich country, in turn, is one in the top decile of the intercountry distribution of per capita incomes, while a poor country is one in the bottom. Armed with this background, typically a majority of the students respond that they would rather be rich in a poor country. They are in fact massively wrong. Defined the way I just did, the poor in a rich country are more than three times richer than the rich in a poor country (Rodrik 2011, chap. 7). The optical illusion that leads the students astray is that the superrich with the BMWs and gated mansions they have seen in poor countries are a miniscule proportion of the population—significantly fewer than the top 10 percent I asked them to focus on. By the time we consider the average of the top decile as a whole, we have taken a huge leap down the income scale. The students have just discovered a telling feature of the world economy: our economic fortunes are determined primarily by where (which country) we are born and only secondarily by our location on the income-distribution scale. Or to put it in more technical but also more accurate terms, most of global inequality is accounted for by inequality across rather than within nations (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002). So much for globalization having revoked the relevance of national borders. Second, consider the role of national identity. One may imagine that attachments to the nation-state have worn thin between the push of transnational affinities, on the one hand, and the pull of local connections, on the other hand. But this does not seem to be the case. National identity remains alive and well, even in some surprising corners of the world. To see the strength of national identity, let us turn to the 2004–8 round of the World Values Survey, which covered about 83,000 individuals in 57 countries (http:// www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). The respondents to the survey were asked a range of questions about the strength of their local, national, and global attachments. I measured the strength of national attachments by computing the percentages of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement “I see myself as a citizen of [country, nation].” I measured the strength of global attachments, in turn, by the percentages of respondents who “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement “I see myself as a world citizen.” In each case, I subtracted these percentages from analogous percentages for “I see myself as a member of my local community” to provide for some kind of normalization. In other words, I measured national and global attachments relative to local attachments. Figure 1 shows the results for the entire global sample, as well as for the United States, the European Union, China, and India individually. What stands out is not so much that national identity is vastly stronger than identity as a “global citizen” —that much was predictable. The surprising finding is how it apparently exerts a stronger pull than membership in the local community, as can be observed in the positive percentages for normalized national identity. This tendency is true across the board and the strongest in the United States and India, two vast countries where we may have expected local attachments to be, if anything, stronger than attachment to the nation-state. I find it also striking that European citizens feel so little attachment to the European Union. In fact, as Figure 1 shows, the idea of citizenship in the European Union seems as remote to Europeans as that of global citizenship, despite long decades of European integration and institution building. It bears saying that these survey results pertain to the period before the present crisis. One can safely guess that European attachments have worn even thinner since 2008.

#### Nation State identity protects the environment

Contorno 2012[Lauren- "The Influence of Cosmopolitan Values on Environmental Attitudes: An International Comparison," Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research:Vol. 17 (2012)]NM

In contrast to the idea of cosmopolitanism evoking environmentalism, others have argued that patriotic values would serve as an effective basis for the environmental movement. Phillip Cafaro argues that patriotism is a virtue, and “environmentalism is one of its most important manifestations.”23 Cafaro defines patriotism as “love, devotion, and a strong differential concern for one’s own locality, state, region, or country, shown both in thought and action.”24 Instead of advocating for a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship, Cafaro charges that it is an attachment to one’s own nation that leads to environmental concern. He bolsters his argument by noting how patriotism has been an important influence in several environmental conservation movements throughout U.S. history. “In the campaigns to create Yellowstone, Yosemite, Grand Canyon, and other national parks in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, patriotic rhetoric often figured prominently.”25 Convincingly, Cafaro argues that “environmentalism can only be a life-affirming and personally enriching activity if it involves connection to the land and communities around you.”26 In other words, it may be difficult for the everyday citizen to form an attachment and moral obligation to ecosystems around the world, because a connection with landscapes often only materializes when one has meaningful, first-hand interactions with it. His overarching defense for patriotic values’ place in the environmental movement is summarized when he says “dividing the world up into smaller units called nations is one way to facilitate real, effective citizenship in an immense world of 6.7 billion people. In the same way, knowledge and devotion to particular landscapes makes environmentalism possible.”27

#### Nation state identity is inevitable and key to solving multiple scenarios for violence and war

Calhoun 7 [Craig, Prof of Social Science at New York University and President of the Social Science Research Council”, Nations Matter: Citizenship, Solidarity and the Cosmopolitcan Dream, p 3-7]

The idea of a nation-state is arguably pernicious. The hyphen ties the notion of a historically or naturally unified people who intrinsically belong together to that of a modern polity with unprecedented military power and capacity for effective internal administration. It has been a recipe for conflicts both internal and external. Populations straddle borders or move long distances to new states while retaining allegiances to old nations. Dominant groups demand that governments enforce cultural conformity, challenging both the individual freedom and the vitality that comes from cultural creativity. And yet, the nation-state neither can be nor should be wished away. Source of so many evils, it is also the framework in which the modern era produced history’s most enduring and successful experiments in largescale democracy. It continues to shape not just the fact of democracy but diversity in its forms (as Chapter 7 suggests). It is basic to the rule of law, not only because most law remains a domestic matter of nation-states but because most international law is literally that: structured by agreements among nation-states. Not least of all, while globalization has produced innumerable paths across state borders, it has opened these very unevenly and disproportionately to the benefit of those with access to high levels of fluid capital. Conversely, it has made belonging to a nation-state and having clear rights within a nation-state more, not less, important. The fact that Hannah Arendt observed more than half a century ago remains true: human rights are secured mainly when they are institutionalized as civil rights.1 In the 1990s, optimistic after the end of the Cold War, a number of enthusiasts for globalization suggested that sovereign states were obsolete. Money, media, and human migrations all flowed across borders; Why should military and political power maintain borders? States bolstered by nationalist passions – and nationalists eager to gain state power – were behind many of the twentieth century’s bloody wars. Surely there was – and remains – a good prima facie case for hoping nation-states might organize less of human loyalty, power, and conflict. And of course new reasons for hating abuses of state authority merged with ancient resentments of state power. But it is one thing to seek limits on the exercise of state power and another to contemplate transcending it. It is one thing to encourage a cosmopolitan pluralism of perspectives and another to regard nationalism as merely a fading inheritance and not a recurrently renewed source of solidarity. It is one thing to seek to advance global civil society and another to imagine democracy can thrive without effective states. The many evils of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries called forth a widespread indignation and, among many, a determination to act. The idea of human rights moved to the forefront not only of discussion but of court cases and treaties. Humanitarian interventions were proposed and implemented in a widening range of circumstances. Ethnic cleansing and genocidal nationalism made the notion that sovereignty should be a barrier to international efforts to do good ring hollow. An international criminal court was created (if not universally recognized). Indeed for a time there seemed no occupation more virtuous than that of a human rights activist or humanitarian aid worker. Almost imperceptibly these shifted from volunteer pursuits and accidental careers for physicians and pacifists to new professional roles, complete with academic courses and credentials, funding from major foundations and national governments, and increasing bureaucracy. And humanitarian action became increasingly intertwined with military interventions, whether for peacekeeping or regime change. At the same time, protesters challenged the dominance of capitalist corporations over the course of globalization. This was misleadingly termed the anti-globalization movement. Though there were some campaigners truly bent on enhancing the autonomy of local populations, most were actually proponents of a different sort of globalization. They objected to environmental depredation, sweatshops, and high prices for necessary drugs but they worked on a global scale and imagined the world in terms of global connections – albeit connections among ordinary people without the powerful mediation of corporations and states. The movement contesting capitalist globalization has not been theory-driven, but its protagonists have shared a general account of the problems of the world in which the twin centers of power – capitalist corporations and nation-states – pursue a logic of self-aggrandizement that neither the natural world nor its human inhabitants can afford. Many have found the language of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri sympathetic: they represent the heterogeneous “multitude” of the world who struggled to be free of a seamless and destructive but nearly exhausted “empire.”2 Something of the same quasi-theory – that states and corporations are both bad and unnecessary – has been widespread among human rights activists and humanitarian aid workers. Both groups, of course, saw first hand the vicious ways in which state elites pursued or held on to power and firms sought or sustained profits. The Sudan is one of the largest scale and longest-lasting examples. Its central government has seldom cared much for the people of Darfur in its west, the non-Arabs of its south, or for that matter most ordinary Sudanese. But the central government has cared about holding the country together and defeating any secessionist movements. It cared all the more when oil was discovered in the south – as did global corporations seeking to extract that oil in “peace.” And it cared all the more when it took on a more pronounced Islamic identity and mission. Despite religious commitment (and partly because of intra-Islamist struggles), it became a peculiarly bad government, but also one too weak to establish peace or prosperity in the Sudan; it unleashed brutal war and civil violence against and among its own people. So there were refugees and internally displaced people, rape as a tactic of war, robber militias, and spreading diseases left untreated. The state did not look very good. Yet by the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were not many left for whom the fantasy of overcoming the state was not tinged with anxiety. Yes, state power was often overweaning, often corrupt, and often mobilized in evil ways. But weak states typically failed their citizens and crises in strong states often unleashed violence and disrupted both lives and livelihoods. Pandemic diseases, global crime, human rights abuses, and forced migration all revealed the dark side to globalization – yet all seemed to call at least in part for better states, not an end to states. Could outsiders make peace in Sudan or would that depend on a more representative, honest, and competent Sudanese government? Or in a range of other African countries, could outside interventions contain the spread of AIDS unless states joined the struggle? And yet, partly because of structural adjustment programs pushed with fiscal good intentions and disastrous human consequences by the World Bank and others, most African states had neither money nor personnel nor health care systems to address AIDS – or for that matter malaria and other diseases. The “failed state” seemed as problematic as the abusive state. And this was not only an issue in Africa but in different local configurations around the world. A great buzzword of the 1990s was “civil society” (see Chapter 4). And indeed, strengthening civil society – loose institutions part neither of the state nor of large-scale projects of capital accumulation – has been an important trend in many places. Both local and transnational voluntary organizations have grown and played crucial roles. Many are religiously inspired and some denominationally organized. Others are secular. All reflect efforts to create social organization on the basis of voluntary relations among people rather than the coercion of either political authority or capital. And yet, civil society organizations depend on money as well as personal connections. And except where states are able to regulate such organizations they are largely unaccountable and nontransparent. Civil society without a public sphere is not necessarily democratic. Civil society is a hugely valuable complement and sometimes corrective to states and markets, but not a substitute for either.3 It is no accident that “global governance” has become almost as ubiquitous a concern in the current decade as global civil society was in the last. But the issues are not only global; they are also national and local. Intermediate powers and solidarities still matter. Individual sovereign states confront a variety of global flows and processes against which they are weak and which in turn weaken some of their other capacities. Global currency and equity markets make it hard for individual countries to operate autonomous fiscal or industrial policies. Global crime is hard to fight with the tools of national legal systems (and especially their domestic criminal law). Global diseases challenge domestic health care systems. Yet these challenges faced by contemporary states no more make them irrelevant than the history of abuses of state power makes the stability and public services states can deliver unimportant. And crucially, most actually existing democracy has been achieved in and through states.